Abstract-Forward secure threshold signature plays an important role in distributed signature. Based on binary tree structure, a new forward secure threshold signature from bilinear pairings is proposed in this paper. In this scheme, each cost of key generation algorithm, key update algorithm, signing algorithm and verifying algorithm is independent of the total number of time periods. At the same time, the scheme needs very few interactions. Because the bilinear pairing used in this scheme is operating over a certain elliptic curve, the scheme inherits the property of short signature, that is, it has short secret key, public key and signature. We formalize the definition of the security model of forward secure threshold signature and prove the proposed scheme is forward secure under the computation Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
INTRODUCTION
Forward secure threshold signature is one kind of important distributed signatures. In an ordinary threshold signature, the signing secret key is divided into several pieces called shares that are held by multiple players, respectively. And only no fewer than a quorum number of players can cooperate to produce the signature. Therefore, threshold signature can make the secret key exposure more difficultly. The forward secure threshold signature cannot only make the key exposure difficultly but also reduce the damage of secret key exposure. In this paradigm, the whole lifetime of signature is divided into multiple time periods. In each period, all players update their secret shares to make the corresponding secret key evolve, however, the public key is fixed during the whole lifetime. Forward secure threshold signature satisfies: If an adversary corrupts fewer than a quorum number of players, she cannot forge signatures of any time periods; even if an adversary can corrupt a quorum number of players to get threshold shares in a certain period, she cannot forge any signature of any previous period.
Threshold signature scheme was firstly presented in Ref. [1] . Afterwards, a lot of related works were done such as [2, 3] . Anderson [4] firstly proposed forward security for digital signature. Refs.
[5~13] presented various forward secure signatures with different properties. Abdalla et al. [14] proposed the first forward secure threshold signature based on scheme [5] . Unfortunately, the public key size and the secret key size are very large in this scheme. What's more, this scheme needed many interactions due to using distributed multiplication of many values protocol. And then, another forward secure threshold signature with proactive property [15] was presented, which was based on scheme [6] . This scheme used a shorter secret key, but had lower efficiency. Wang et al. [16] pointed out the distributed multiplication protocol in scheme [15] was insecure. Chu et al. [17] proposed a forward secure threshold signature scheme that couldn't tolerate malicious adversary and had not any security proofs as an extension of his main work. Recently, Ref. [18] proposed a forward secure threshold signature from bilinear pairings based on scheme [10] .
In this paper, we propose a new forward secure threshold signature scheme from bilinear pairings based on [11] . Because the proposed scheme adopts binary tree structure to perform key storage and key update, it makes the sub-algorithms very efficient. Different from previous schemes, the costs of key generation, key update, signing and verifying algorithms are all independent of the total time period T. It means our scheme will still very efficient when T is a large number, which is impossible for all previous schemes. Because the scheme is constructed over a certain elliptic curve, it has shorter public key, secret key and signature. Furthermore, we give the formal security definition of forward secure threshold signature. Finally, we prove that the scheme is forward secure under the computation Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. CDH assumption and Bilinear Pairing
Let 1 G be an additive group of prime order q and 2 G be a multiplicative group of the same prime order q . And Given ( , , ) P aP bP where , R q a b Z ∈ , compute abP . ab e aP bQ e P Q = .
Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in 1 1 G G × to the identity in 2 G . Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ˆ( , ) e P Q for any 1 , P Q G ∈ . A randomized algorithm IG that takes as input a security parameter k Z ∈ is a CDH parameter generator if it runs in time polynomial in k and outputs the description of two groups 1 G , 2 G and a bilinear map
We denote the output of this algorithm as 1 2( , , )
B. Forward Secure Threshold Signature and Its Security Definition 2 (Key-evolving threshold signature). A key-evolving threshold signature scheme is a quadruple of algorithms, FTS(t,s,n)=(FTS.key, FTS.update, FTS.sign, FTS.verify), where t is the maximum number of players corrupted by the adversary; s is the minimum number of honest players so that signature computation is feasible; n is the total number of players.
FTS.key: the key generation algorithm, inputs a security parameter k N ∈ and the total number of time periods T, and generates a public key PK and the initial shares FTS.sign: the signing algorithm, inputs the current time period j and a message M, and the participant players jointly generate a signature <j, tag> of message M for period j using their shares.
FTS.verify: the verification algorithm, inputs the public key PK, a message M and a signature <j, tag> and returns 1 if <j, tag> is a valid signature of M or 0, otherwise.
We say that <j, tag> is a valid signature of message M if FTS.verify (M, <j, tag>)=1.
If a key-evolving threshold signature scheme is a forward secure threshold signature scheme, it needs to satisfy: even if the adversary corrupts up to t players, it is computationally infeasible for her to forge any signature of previous time period. We give the experiment to evaluate the security in random oracle (RO) model [19] : 
. From above experiment, we can obtain the adversary model in RO model: the adversary knows the public key, the total number of time periods T and the current time period. A hash function H is viewed as a random oracle. Adversary F runs in three phases: in the first phase, chosen message attack phase (cma), F can query the signature of any message she selects with respect to the current secret key by accessing to a signature oracle. At the end of each time period, she can decide whether to stay in this phase or switch to over-threshold phase. In the second phase, over-threshold phase, for a particular time period b, the adversary may corrupt up to a threshold number of players. It means F can learn the secret key b SK . In the last phase, the forgery phase, the adversary outputs a signature message pair, that is, a forgery. The adversary is considered to be successful if she forges a signature of some new message (that is, not queried previously) for some time period prior to b. During the whole procedure, F can query the random oracle H corresponding to a collision-resistant hash function. Depending on the verification results, the experiment will return 1 or 0 to indicate the success or failure of the adversary F.
Definition 2 (Forward-security in the Random Oracle Model). Let FTS(t,s,n)= (FTS.key FTS.update, FTS.sign, FTS.verify) be a key-evolving threshold signature scheme, H be a random oracle and the algorithm F be an adversary as described above. We say that an algorithm F ( , , , ) We use the int Jo Exp RSS − − protocol [20] as the VDSG protocol in our scheme. We will use the security results of it to prove the security of our threshold signature scheme.
(2) Zero-knowledge proof protocol [18] Let G be a cyclic group of some prime order q, where G is represented additively. Let ( 0... )
be the generators of G.
Prover P wants to convince verifier V that she knows these values ( 1... )
We give a non-interactive version by a collisionresistant hash function: H: [18] . The protocol n n NI oof VS P P P G G H ′ − is described as follows:
at random, and
F , and , ( 1... ) 
III. THE PROPOSED FORWARD SECURE THRESHOLD SIGNATURE
A. The Binary Tree Structure and Notations
The scheme adopts binary tree structure that has been used in many cryptographic designs such as hierarchical ID-based cryptography [21] . A full binary tree with depth l can represent Select cryptographic hash functions
Let the public key 
IV. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
The complexity analysis is considered in terms of T like [9, 10] . The table 1 gives the comparisons among our scheme, schemes in [14, 15, 18] , where l′ is a security parameter in scheme [14, 15] . The complexities of key generation, key update, signing and verifying algorithms in scheme [14] and scheme [15] are (1) O T and (1)
respectively. The complexities of key generation, key update algorithms are (1) O , and the complexities of signing and verifying algorithms are (1) log O T in scheme [18] . Thanks to the pre-order traversal technique of binary trees, the operations of key generation and key update algorithms are independent of the total number of time periods T in our proposed FTS scheme. The complexities of signing and verifying algorithms are both O(1) due to the adopted new strategy in key update.
The total interactions in our scheme are very few. There is no interaction in our key generation algorithm. Key update algorithm will execute twice VDSG protocol simultaneously, but only needs once interaction. In signing algorithm twice interactions are needed in total, one happens in VDSG protocol and the other happens in NIProof-VS protocol. [14] Scheme in [15] Scheme in [18] Our scheme Proof. 
( , ) ( || , , )) ≥ + and 2 1 n t ≥ + , our ( , , ) FTS t s n scheme can tolerant an adversary able to corrupt t players. Proof. When 1 s t ≥ + and 2 1 n t ≥ + , even if the adversary is able to corrupt t players, there are still 1 s t ≥ + honest players. These honest players can make FTS.update and FTS.sign algorithms be executed properly. According to theorem 2, the scheme can tolerant a malicious adversary corrupting t players. 
Proof. Similarly to the method in Ref. [10] , we can replace the hash functions 1 H and 3 H with 1-wise and (l+1)-wise independent hash functions in function families. We view 2 H as a random oracle and 4 H as an ordinary hash function in the following proof. Assuming F being an adversary 2 ( , , ,
tε -attack ( , , ) FTS t s n , we construct a PPT adversary I ( , ) t ε ′ ′ -break CDHP in group 1 G . Firstly, the algorithm I is given parameters 1 2( , , ) G G e generated by IG (1 ) ( , , , , , , , , , ) PK G G e P R l H H H H = and T to F. I maintains two tables: 2 H oracle table and signature query table to answer the queries from F.
I simulates the FTS.update procedure at first in order to provide necessary parameters for replying to F's signature queries and over-threshold query. Let At that time, F runs in cma phase. F may query 2 H oracle and signature oracle, so I needs to simulate these oracles to answer the queries. In doing so, we have to simulate F's view F VIEW of the protocol. W.l.o.g. assume that the adversary F corrupts players 1,2,…,t.
The simulation of 2 H queries: When F queries the oracle 2 H at a point , , j M w P U Z < > where || Event 2 E : F outputs d=over-threshold and the overthreshold phase is period b. There is 2 Pr[ ] 1/ E T = . Because F can't distinguish the simulation given by I from the real world, the probability that the period b which I guesses is equal to the period in which F enters her over-threshold phase is 1/ T . It is contractive to the assumption that the group 1 G generated by IG (1 ) k is a ( , ) t ε ′ ′ -break CDH group. Therefore, the theorem follows.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the structure of binary tree, we construct an efficient forward secure threshold signature scheme from bilinear pairings. All the running costs of key generation, key update, signing and verifying algorithms are independent of the total number of time periods T. Finally, we prove the proposed scheme is robust and forward secure when CDHP is hard.
